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Applicant Screening and Performance-Related Outcomes
By Fali Huang and Peter Cappelli*
A central question in economics is how to
ensure that employees do not shirk their workplace responsibilities. Most of the research on
this question focuses on economic governance
schemes that provide incentives to induce
employees to act in the interests of their employers (Canice Prendergast 1999). Some studies
examine arrangements to induce self-selection
by potential employees having heterogeneous
unobserved human capital. An alternative to
self-selection, much less studied by economists (for an exception, see Casey Ichniowski,
Kathryn Shaw, and Giovanna Prennushi 1997),
is applicant screening, where the employer
attempts to identify which applicants have the
desirable attributes. An advantage of the screening approach versus self-selection is that it does
not require the applicant to even be aware of
possessing relevant attributes.
Virtually all employers use some level of
applicant screening. It is a fundamental part
of the human resources function in most firms.
Although different kinds of jobs may require
different attributes, arguably the most fundamental attribute and the one that cuts across virtually all jobs can be described as work ethic,
what we might think of as the ability to work
hard independent of monitoring by employers
or of rewards. The field of personnel psychology
has spent a great deal of time examining attributes of individuals associated with work ethic,
and one of the most important is the personality
construct known as “conscientiousness,” which
has been found to be a reliable and consistent
dimension of personality that relates strongly
to job performance across types of jobs (Frank
Schmidt and John Hunter 1998).
In this paper, we study the screening of job candidates to find workers with a stronger work ethic

and examine the effects on performance-related
outcomes, using data from a national sample
of US employers. We find that employers who
screen applicants more intensively for factors
that should predict work ethic are able to use
less expensive monitoring of employees. They
are also able to make greater use of teamwork,
an approach to organizing work that uses less
supervision and gives employees greater autonomy, which otherwise creates greater opportunity for shirking. This screening is associated
with higher employee productivity, lower involuntary turnover rates, and higher wages via
rent-sharing. Screening for other attributes, in
contrast, such as more traditional human capital
measures, does not produce these results.
This paper contributes to research on the
synergies among work and human resource
practices by highlighting the importance of
screening in affecting a firm’s workplace practices and performance-related outcomes, which
has not yet been systematically analyzed in
the literature. Our results are also consistent
with basic gift-exchange patterns in that workers make extra effort and get rewarded with
higher wages (George Akerlof 1982). And a new
insight from our paper, especially in the light of
recent negative evidence from field experiments
(Uri Gneezy and John List 2006), is that screening for more conscientious employees may be
crucial for the gift-exchange relationship to be
mutually beneficial and sustainable.
I. Hypotheses

Several hypotheses can be generated from a
theoretical model that includes costly screening
and monitoring in a principal-agent framework
with workers differing in work ethic, where a
worker with a stronger work ethic requires less
monitoring and lower extrinsic rewards to elicit
effort. Work ethic is not publicly observable but
can be detected by a screening technique.
The first hypothesis is that there should be
some substitution between the use of screening
for work ethic and monitoring, because greater
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use of screening can lead to a work force that
is less likely to shirk and therefore requires less
monitoring to achieve a given level of performance. We might also expect the monitoring/
screening decision to be related to the production function and the choice of work systems.
For example, employers with teamwork-based
systems and those that rely on “empowered”
employees (i.e., where employees have greater
discretion to act) make monitoring by supervisors more difficult and should therefore make
greater investments in screening. That is, we
expect to find that screening for work ethic and
teamwork are complementary practices, and
this is our second hypothesis.
The following result from the model may
seem counterintuitive: Employers should pay
employees with a stronger work ethic more
despite the fact that lower extrinsic incentives
are needed to motivate them. The usual understanding is that employers pay such workers less
and hence get higher profits; this may arise in
a typical principal-agent model when competition among employers for talent is ignored, but
it is unlikely to be an equilibrium result, because
competition would bid up the wages for such
employees in equilibrium. In other words, workers with better work ethics contribute value by
reducing the need for monitoring, saving money
for employers; and in order to retain these conscientious workers, employers may be motivated
to pay them higher wages as rent-sharing. We
might therefore expect a positive relationship
between screening for work ethic and employee
compensation, which is the third hypothesis.
Such a compensation package with less monitoring and higher pay that is offered to workers
with stronger work ethics, however, is even more
attractive to weaker agents, which renders selfselection infeasible, and thus principals have to
rely on careful applicant screening to separate
the conscientious agents from the selfish ones,
albeit imperfectly.
The fourth prediction of the model is that
more selective screening leads to higher productivity, because the employee hired by a more
selective employer has a higher probability of
being a conscientious worker. This combined
with the first result that those principals who
screen more monitor less implies that the involuntary turnover rates of employees are lower
when the screening selectivity is higher, which
is the fifth hypothesis.
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Another result of the model shows that firm
profits may not strictly increase in individual
screening selectivity, because the higher surplus associated with more selective screening is
allocated to employees in the format of higher
wages, which are essentially a part of the rent
generated by agent work ethic. This may shed
light on the puzzling empirical results that firms
adopting high performance work practices
do not necessarily earn higher profits while
wages are higher (Sandra Black and Lisa Lynch
2004; Peter Cappelli and David Neumark 2001;
Richard Freeman and Morris Kleiner 2000).
To be sure, however, the model predicts that
all employers may obtain higher profits when
screening is less costly or when the average
work ethic is higher, and so collectively principals do benefit from more selective screening
for work ethic.
II. Data Description

The five hypotheses described above are
tested using data from the 1997 National
Employer Survey (NES97), a nationally representative sample of private establishments with
more than 20 employees. Our analysis focuses
exclusively on production or frontline employees
in all industries. The sampling weights are taken
into consideration in all the estimation results,
and correlations of random errors among firms
within the same industry are allowed.
We use a variety of measures to capture
efforts to screen applicants for work ethic.
Perhaps the most common measure of how
extensively an employer screens applicants is
the number of candidates interviewed for each
job opening, which is labeled Candidates#, a
measure that reflects screening for attributes of
any kind, not just work ethic. The NES97 also
asks a series of more specific questions about
selection. The stem of the question asks the manager: “After you have established your applicant
pool and obtained information about potential
employee, what characteristics or attributes are
most critical in making your hiring decision?”
The importance scale ranges from 1 to 5, indicating respectively “no value,” “some value,”
“important,” “very important,” and “essential.”
Respondents use this scale to assess 12 general
attributes about applicants, one of which is an
applicant’s attitude toward work. This variable
seems specifically oriented toward the goal of
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identifying intrinsic work ethic. It is also the
highest ranked item. To be clear, the variable
measures the importance the employer gives to
work ethic in assessing candidates, rather than
the mechanisms used to do such screening,
which we do not observe directly. Because most
firms report either 4 or 5 for the importance of
work attitude in hiring decision, a binary version (= 1 if reporting 5) of this variable, labeled
Work Attitude Screening, is used as the measure
of screening selectivity for work ethic.
The remaining 11 screening criteria can
be easily divided into two groups, whose
average levels of importance are labeled
Work Experience Screening and Academic
Performance Screening, respectively. These
three selectivity variables are positively and significantly correlated with each other, and firms
do vary a lot in the scores they assign to them.
We measure the extent of employer monitoring of employees with a standard measure,
Employee-Supervisor Ratio. It is the average number of employees that report to each
front-line supervisor, where higher ratios mean
lower monitoring intensity. The percentage of
production employees involved in self-managed teams, denoted by Teamwork, captures
a common work system that involves low levels of monitoring, where employees manage
themselves.
In terms of outcome measures, wages are
measured by the log of the average annual pay
of production employees. A simple measure of
employee productivity is Relative Productivity,
which equals one if the employer considers its
employees’ productivity to be higher than its
major competitors and zero if not. About 50
percent of firms in the sample consider their
employees relatively more productive, and so
it seems to be quite reliable. It is also a commonly used measure of productivity across
industries in related literature (e.g., Alex Bryson
and Freeman 2008). The variable Involuntary
Turnover equals the percentage of permanent
workforce in the firm that left involuntarily (e.g.,
fired or laid off) in the past year.
The fact that our data are cross-sectional
limits the ability to make causal arguments,
but as noted above, most hypotheses are associative rather than causal. Many questions in
the NES97 survey are asked only for frontline
production employees, which greatly narrows
the range of possible jobs we can examine, but

that limitation also helps control for exogenous
sources of variation. Detailed industry and size
dummies are also used to control for potential variations in the important aspects of production functions and in the costs or ability
to screen and monitor employees (e.g., scale
economies). Other potentially relevant factors
controlled include standard human capital measures—the average years of schooling for production employees, their weekly working hours,
the usage of computers on the job by supervisors
and employees, the length of time for a new hire
to reach job proficiency, ratios of women and
minorities among permanent employees, and
union strength. These variables are used as controls to account for the remaining elements in
the model that may influence a firm’s monitoring and screening choices as well as wage levels,
employee productivity and turnover rates. Due
to missing values, the sample sizes vary across
regression models.
III. Estimation Results

Table 1 summarizes our main estimation
results, which are robust to alternative specifications (not reported). Column 1 shows the
relationship between Employee-Supervisor
Ratio and screening selectivity for work ethic.
Firms that screen more for work ethic should
hire better agents who need less monitoring
to make the required effort. Because a higher
employee-supervisor ratio implies a lower monitoring intensity, the coefficient of Work Attitude
Screening should be positive in the regression,
and this is indeed the case. It remains positive and significant even when controlling for
Candidates#, the measure of overall screening selectivity, and the other two screening
variables, Work Experience Screening and
Academic Performance Screening, all of which,
in contrast, have insignificant coefficients. The
estimates suggest that treating work attitude as
essential in hiring employees (as opposed to
anything less than essential) enables a typical
frontline manager to supervise about 2 more
employees on average, which is equivalent to the
effect of interviewing about 14 more job candidates for each production job opening (over 2.5
standard deviations of Candidates#). This suggests that the tradeoff between the intensities of
screening for work ethic and monitoring can be
quite substantial.
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Table 1—Screening Selectivity and Firm Outcomes

Work attitude screening
Candidates#
Work experience screening
Academic performance
screening
Observations
R2

OLS
employee-supervisor ratio
(1)

OLS
teamwork
(2)

1,960
0.18

2,020
0.15

1.77
(0.70)**
0.12
(0.08)
1.05
(1.23)
−0.31
(0.52)

5.84
(2.06)***
0.33
(0.27)
3.40
(2.40)
−1.03
(0.63)

OLS
wages
(3)

Logit
productivity
(4)

OLS
turnover
(5)

1,930
0.70

1,974
0.14

989
0.10

0.06
(0.03)**
0.00
(0.00)
0.04
(0.02)**
−0.02
(0.01)*

0.19
(0.11)*
0.02
(0.02)
0.10
(0.14)
0.63
(0.30)**

−1.52
(0.79)*
−0.00
(0.03)
−0.61
(0.97)
0.31
(0.91)

Notes: Standard deviations are in the parentheses. The data are from 1997 National Employer Survey (NES97) in the United
States. The other control variables include the average schooling of production employees and their working hours per week,
computer usage by supervisors and production employees, union representation, months to reach job proficiency for a typical new hire, the ratios of minority and women in the permanent employees, as well as five size dummies and 21 industry
dummies.
*** Significant at the 1 percent level.
** Significant at the 5 percent level.
   * Significant at the 10 percent level.

When Teamwork is the dependent variable in
column 2, the results are similar: the coefficient
of Work Attitude Screening is again positive and
significant, while those of the other screening
variables are still insignificant. These estimates
suggest that treating work attitude as essential
in hiring employees is associated with an average increase of 5.84 percentage of employees
involved in teamwork, which is about 19 percentage of a standard deviation of Teamwork.
The evidence indicates a strong synergy between
screening employees for work ethic and the use
of low-monitoring work practices that make use
of such behavior. More generally, the results are
consistent with the notion that there is a tradeoff between management approaches that rely
on conscientious workers and empowered working arrangements as compared to those that rely
on high levels of monitoring.
The relationship between log wages and
screening selectivity is tested in column 3,
where the number of employee benefits contributed by the firm is also included as a control.
Because more selective principals offer higher
wages to their agents in order to retain them, we
predict a positive coefficient for screening selectivity for work ethic, which is indeed the case. In
contrast, the coefficient of Candidates#, though
positive, is insignificant as before, while those

of the other two screening variables are significant but with different signs; the negative sign of
Academic Performance Screening may be justifiable because academic results are presumably
less important for production/frontline workers
than work attitude and working experiences.
Based on the estimates, treating work ethic as an
essential criterion in hiring employees is associated with $1,520.57 increase of annual pay or 77
percent of the average monthly salary of production/frontline employees. When the two monitoring variables (Employee-Supervisor Ratio
and Teamwork) are further controlled, they are
insignificant and hardly affect coefficients of
the three screening variables. This is consistent
with our theoretical arguments that screening
for better workers is underlying the association
between lower monitoring and higher wages.
Column 4 estimates the relationship between
screening selectivity and the relative employee
productivity compared to a firm’s major competitors. While we understand the inherent
weakness of a self-reported productivity measure, the coefficient of Work Attitude Screening
is indeed positive and significant, which is at
least consistent with our hypothesized relationship. The estimated effects of the other three
screening variables are also positive, but most
are insignificant. The results are similar if either
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a probit or linear probability model is used. The
estimates show that treating work attitude as
an essential criterion is associated with 37 percent of a standard deviation increase of Relative
Productivity.
The relationship between the involuntary
turnover rate of a firm’s employees and screening for work ethic is estimated in column 5.
As expected, the coefficient of Work Attitude
Screening is significant and negative, while
those of the other screening variables are insignificant. The estimates suggest that treating
work attitude as essential in hiring employees
is associated with a reduction of the involuntary turnover rate of 17 percent of a standard
deviation.
IV. Conclusions

We find that employers’ paying more attention to positive workplace attitudes in assessing
job applicants, what we describe as work ethic,
is related to less monitoring, greater use of
teamwork, higher employee productivity, lower
involuntary turnover rates, and higher wages for
production or frontline workers. The underlying intuition is that firms that are more selective
in screening job candidates for work ethic are
more likely to hire conscientious workers who
are willing to work hard with less monitoring.
These employers can then make use of practices
like teamwork that involve workers more and
monitor them less. Reduced monitoring costs
create rents that the firm shares in the form of
higher wages in order to attract and retain these
good workers. Because employees with stronger
work ethic are less likely to shirk, their productivity is higher relative to other firms and their
involuntary turnover rates are lower. It is important to note that these relations do not hold for
the other types of screening. In future research,
it would be interesting to examine the causality
in these relationships as well as the factors that
may cause them to vary, such as whether higher

dismissal costs lead to greater screening of all
kinds and how screening for different attributes
might vary with labor market conditions.
References
Akerlof, George A. 1982. “Labor Contracts as

Partial Gift Exchange.” Quarterly Journal of
Economics, 97(4): 543–69.
Black, Sandra E., and Lisa M. Lynch. 2004.
“What’s Driving the New Economy? The Benefits of Workplace Innovation.” Economic
Journal, 114(493): F97–116.
Bryson, Alex, and Richard Freeman. 2008. “How
Does Shared Capitalism Affect Economic
Performance in the UK?” National Bureau of
Economic Research Working Paper 14235.
Cappelli, Peter, and David Neumark. 2001. “Do
‘High-Performance’ Work Practices Improve
Establishment-Level Outcomes?” Industrial
and Labor Relations Review, 54(4): 737–75.
Freeman, Richard B., and Morris M. Kleiner.

2000. “Who Benefits Most from Employee
Involvement: Firms or Workers?” American
Economic Review, 90(2): 219–23.
Gneezy, Uri, and John A. List. 2006. “Putting
Behavioral Economics to Work: Testing for
Gift Exchange in Labor Markets Using Field
Experiments.” Econometrica, 74(5): 1365–84.
Ichniowski, Casey, Kathryn Shaw, and Giovanna
Prennushi. 1997. “The Effects of Human

Resource Management Practices on Productivity: A Study of Steel Finishing Lines.” American Economic Review, 87(3): 291–313.
Prendergast, Canice. 1999. “The Provision of
Incentives in Firms.” Journal of Economic Literature, 37(1): 7–63.
Schmidt, Frank L., and John E. Hunter. 1998.
“The Validity and Utility of Selection Methods
in Personnel Psychology: Practical and Theoretical Implications of 85 Years of Research
Findings.” Psychological Bulletin, 124(2):
262–74.

This article has been cited by:
1. Florian Englmaier, Thomas Kolaska, Stephen Leider. 2016. Reciprocity in Organizations: Evidence
from the UK. CESifo Economic Studies ifw006. [CrossRef]
2. Vera Brenčič. 2015. Employers' Efforts to Deter Shirking in Teams: Evidence from Job Vacancies.
LABOUR 29:10.1111/labr.2015.29.issue-1, 52-78. [CrossRef]
3. Rocio Bonet. 2014. High-Involvement Work Practices and the Opportunities for Promotion in the
Organization. Industrial Relations: A Journal of Economy and Society 53:10.1111/irel.2014.53.issue-2,
295-324. [CrossRef]
4. Florian Englmaier, Sebastian Strasser, Joachim Winter. 2013. Worker characteristics and wage
differentials: Evidence from a gift-exchange experiment. Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization
. [CrossRef]
5. Florian Englmaier,, Stephen Leider. 2012. Contractual and Organizational Structure with Reciprocal
Agents. American Economic Journal: Microeconomics 4:2, 146-183. [Abstract] [View PDF article]
[PDF with links]
6. Björn Bartling,, Ernst Fehr,, Klaus M. Schmidt. 2012. Screening, Competition, and Job Design:
Economic Origins of Good Jobs. American Economic Review 102:2, 834-864. [Abstract] [View PDF
article] [PDF with links]

